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Love and (Polygamous) Marriage?





Opponents of same-sex marriage suggest that legalizing same-sex marriage will start a 
slide down a “slippery-slope” leading to the legalization of all kinds of salacious family 
arrangements including polygamy. In this paper, I argue that because previous attempts 
by liberal political theorists to combat such slippery-slope arguments have been 
unsuccessful, there are two options left open to political liberals. Either one could 
embrace polygamy as a logically consistent implication of extending civil liberties to 
same-sex couples or one could find a new strategy for blocking the slide down the 
slope. I take the second option arguing that we ought to devise a harm principle for 
domestic partnerships. Once this principle has been established, it becomes clear that 
the risk of exploitation for those potentially occupying the multiple side of the mar-
riage is sufficient reason to reject polygamous marriage arrangements. I conclude that, 
contrary to appearances, holding both (a) same-sex marriage is permissible and (b) 
polygamous marriage is impermissible is at the same time consistent and consistently 
liberal.
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1 A Theory of Justice (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971).
2 Justice, Gender, and the Family (New York: Basic Books, 1989).
3 Rawls does disavow this charge in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 2001) saying that the idea that his two principles of justice do not apply to 
the family is a misconception. In fact, in his later writings he goes so far as to agree with Okin 
that there is an implicit critique of gender-structured social institutions, e.g., the family, in TJ 
(p. 162–168). Additionally, in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” Rawls is even more spe-
cific about the proper relationship between the state and the family saying “in a democratic 
regime the government’s legitimate interest is that public law and policy should support and 
regulate…the institutions needed to reproduce political society over time. These include the 
family (in a form that is just), arrangements for rearing and educating children, and institu-
tions of public health generally…. Given this interest, the government would appear to have 
no interest in the particular form of family life, or of relations among the sexes, except 
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1 Introduction
Opponents of same-sex marriage employ a “slippery-slope” argument charging 
that legalizing same-sex marriage will lead to more permissive family arrange-
ments like polygamy. In this paper, I argue that previous attempts to combat 
the “slippery-slope” argument within the framework of liberal political theory 
have been unsuccessful. If I am right that these responses fail, one option is 
simply to embrace polygamy as a logically consistent implication of extending 
civil liberties to same-sex couples. However, I defend a new strategy for block-
ing the slippery-slope argument that can account for the permissibility of 
same-sex marriages, while casting serious doubt on the permissibility of polyg-
amous marriages. More importantly, my strategy remains solidly within a lib-
eral political framework striking the proper balance between respecting 
autonomy and protecting individual citizens from harm.
Liberal theorists historically have been divided about whether family 
arrangements belong within the purview of a theory of political justice. 
Interpreters of Rawls’ early work widely read him as relegating family life to the 
private sphere since he explicitly excludes the family from the basic structure 
of society,1 while Susan Moller Okin2 famously challenges the idea that domes-
tic relationships have no bearing on questions of political justice. Heeding 
Okin’s warning, many contemporary liberal theorists recognize the family not, 
as a natural, pre-political, hierarchical private association,3 but rather as a 
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 insofar as that form or those relations in some way affect the orderly reproduction of society 
over time” (The University of Chicago Law Review Vol. 64, No.3 (Summer 1997), p. 779).
4 For a helpful survey of work in legal and political theory about the relationship between the 
liberal state and the family, see Martha Minow and Mary Lyndon Shanley’s ‘Relational Rights 
and Responsibilities: Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law,’ Hypatia. 
Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 1996), pp. 4–29. More recently, Christie Hartley and Lori Watson offer a 
general account, based on the fundamental interests of citizens, of how political liberals 
should determine whether legal marriage is a matter of basic justice (‘Political Liberalism, 
Marriage and the Family,’ Law and Philosophy Vol. 31, No. 2 (2012), pp. 185–212).
5 For example, see Will Kymlicka’s ‘Rethinking the Family,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 20, 
No. 1 (1991), pp. 77–98.
6 For example, see Okin’s JGF (1989).
socially-constructed, or at least partially socially-constructed, union that is an 
appropriate target of political justice.4 I also take it as a starting point that fam-
ily structures play a crucial role in the fair treatment of citizens within liberal 
democratic societies. For that reason, I think states ought to play some, albeit 
limited, role in overseeing the structure of marriage and the family.
There have been two general conceptions concerning the role of state over-
sight: a “contract-based approach”5 and a “rights-based approach.”6 On the 
“contractual” model, the law treats civil marriage as it treats any other contrac-
tual association. The value of individual autonomy reigns, the members of the 
partnership are free to set the terms of the contract, and the state does not 
interfere unless there is some clear threat to minor children or to individuals 
outside of the family association or there is some reason to think that at least 
one partner has not made a fully autonomous decision. Thus, the threshold for 
harm that justifies state intervention on this view is set relatively high. As a 
result, rejection of polygamy by adherents to this view is contingent on identify-
ing a harm specifically linked to polygamous marriage. Because I think the most 
persuasive case for a harm that could play this role is the argument that polyg-
amy limits female autonomy, I explore below whether the female autonomy 
objection could also stop the slide down the slippery slope successfully drawing 
the distinction between same-sex marriage and polygamous marriage.
On the other hand, theorists who adopt the “rights-based” approach think 
that the contractual model, because of its focus upon autonomy to the detri-
ment of other important liberal values, fails to recognize or prevent serious 
injustices. Modeled on Rawls’ difference principle, the rights-based view says 
that we ought to derive principles for guiding marriage and family law from a 
basic commitment to equality of freedom for each individual member of soci-
ety. So this account takes as operative a relatively lower threshold for harm 
triggering state intervention. The best objection to polygamy coming out of 
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7 Matthew B. O’Brien argues that true liberals cannot be in favor of redefining civil marriage to 
include same-sex unions because Rawls’ political liberalism actually prohibits same-sex mar-
riage. Since all of the arguments in favor of recognizing these unions as civil marriages stem 
from controversial doctrines about the good, such a policy would violate the ideal of public 
reason (‘Why Liberal Neutrality Prohibits Same-Sex Marriage: Rawls, Political Liberalism, 
and the Family,’ British Journal of American Legal Studies Vol. 1, No. 2 (2012), pp. 411–466). 
O’Brien’s argument, then, challenges the claim that my view is solidly grounded in a liberal 
perspective. The scope of this paper does not permit me to develop a competing interpreta-
tion of Rawls’ view. But even if O’Brien’s interpretation of Rawls is correct on this point, I 
suspect that many liberals would choose to abandon Rawls in favor of marriage equality.
this approach is what I call the asymmetry of power objection. The claim here 
is that polygamy violates the rights of those individuals entering into marriage 
on the multiple side (whether male or female), who are expected to share a 
role and the rights and responsibilities that come with that role.
The disagreement between advocates of the contractual approach and the 
rights-based approach to civil marriage tracks a more general ongoing debate 
among liberal theorists; however, I do think that finding the right distinction 
between harmful and non-harmful types of marriage is key to blocking the slip-
pery-slope objection to same-sex marriage. Ultimately, what is needed is a ‘harm 
principle’ for domestic partnerships and I construct such a principle here.
My argument in the remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: in the next 
section, I show how both the contractual and the rights-based models fail to stop 
the slide down the slippery-slope offered by opponents of same-sex marriage. In 
particular, I reject two standard liberal objections to polygamy: (O1) the female 
autonomy objection put forth by proponents of the contractual model and (O2) 
the asymmetry of power objection put forth by proponents of the rights-based 
model. But, in section III, I show how a third objection to polygamy, (O3) the risk 
of exploitation, actually succeeds in stopping the slide and forms the basis for 
my ‘harm principle.’ In the fourth section, I forestall three objections to my view. 
The first two purport to show that my argument proves too little and the last 
purports to show that my argument proves too much. I conclude that holding 
both (a) same-sex marriage is permissible and (b) polygamous marriage is 
impermissible is at the same time consistent and consistently liberal.7
2 Marriage Equality and Polygamy: Can You Have One Without the 
Other?
Opponents of same-sex marriage, looking to capitalize on the intuition that 
some types of domestic unions ought to be prohibited because of the potential 
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8 Justice Antonin Scalia offers an argument along these lines in his dissent to the Supreme 
Court decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003). The court decided in a 6-3 ruling to strike down 
Texas’s sodomy law making same-sex sexual activity legal. Scalia referencing bigamy, adult 
incest, bestiality, and obscenity, says, “The Texas statute undeniably seeks to further the 
belief of its citizens that certain forms of sexual behavior are ‘immoral and unacceptable’.” 
He agrees that laws against such behavior protect a legitimate state interest and that the 
court’s decision “effectively decrees the end of all morals legislation” (Section IV). See also, 
Andrew Sullivan’s (ed.) Same-Sex Marriage: Pro and Con (Vintage 2004), especially, chapter 8, 
p. 273–294.
for harm to the individuals involved, offer the following slippery-slope argu-
ment against legalizing same-sex marriage:
(1) Legalization of same-sex marriage would provide a principle for legaliza-
tion of other, similar types of ‘non-traditional’ domestic partnerships 
(e.g., polygamy, bestiality, adult incest).
(2) We, as a society, agree that these other types of ‘non-traditional’ domestic 
partnerships are licentious.
(3) Providing a principle for legalization of licentious domestic partnerships 
would virtually guarantee that such practices would increase.
(4) The harm caused by the increase in such practices is sufficient to justify 
outlawing that which would provide the principle for legalization.
(5) Therefore, same-sex marriage ought not be legalized.
There are, of course, many problems with this argument, but the main prob-
lem lies in specifying and demonstrating the harm caused by these non-tradi-
tional relationships (premise (4)) and establishing the link between that 
alleged harm and legalization of same-sex marriage (premise (3)). Even were 
we to concede that some of the types of arrangements on the list are harmful 
and so ought to be prohibited, this would not impeach all types on the list. 
Thus, the argument, as stated, is invalid or at the very least, incomplete. 
Nonetheless, there are defenders of this type of argument8 and their main line 
of defense is an appeal to an assumption that underlies premise (1): that same-
sex marriage is analogous to polygamy in that these types of unions are all in 
some respect harmful or licentious. In this section, I begin to test the plausibil-
ity of this analogy. More specifically, I examine whether either of two objec-
tions to polygamy suggests a harm principle that could be used to deny the 
analogy and hence, to stop the slide down the slope.
There are two prominent objections to polygamy: (O1) the female autonomy 
objection and (O2) the asymmetry of power objection. Let us examine each 
objection in turn.
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9 Elizabeth Anderson makes a similar point about commercial surrogate motherhood arguing 
that liberal democratic institutions ought not to enforce surrogacy contracts because such 
contracts treat labor that is unique to women as a mere commodity and so institutionally 
supporting these contracts encourages disrespect for women (‘Is Women’s Labor a 
Commodity?,’ Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter, 1990), pp. 71–92).
2.1 (O1) The Female Autonomy Objection to Polygamy
(O1) says that the practice of polygamy oppresses and subordinates women. 
The reasoning for the objection is as follows: because the overwhelming major-
ity of polygamous relationships occurring in the US and other liberal democra-
cies have been polygynous (i.e., occurring between one man and multiple 
women) and, for the most part, have occurred within deeply patriarchal reli-
gious communities, decriminalizing such practices would provide legal cover 
for a form of female oppression. The men, who currently oppress women in 
these relationships, would take decriminalization of polygamous marriage as a 
signal that society condones their treatment of women. This would have two 
further effects: (a) it would increase the number of individual women in polyg-
amous relationships and thus, the number of individual women being 
oppressed; and (b) it would foster the inappropriate attitude that women 
deserve to be treated as second-class citizens, thus damaging the self-respect 
of women as a group. Insofar as citizens generally associate polygamy with 
oppression and subordination of women, legalizing it not only harms individ-
ual women, but also sends the message that we, as a society, are not all that 
interested in ending discrimination against women.9
Now if it is true that legalizing polygamy would cause an increase in the 
practice as polygyny and that such a policy would be understood as expressing 
a lack of concern for the oppression and subordination of women, (O1) seems 
to imply a slide-stopping response to the slippery slope: political liberals ought 
to oppose polygamy because they generally ought to oppose any type of con-
tract that increases oppression. Put in terms of the contractual model, were we 
convinced that permitting polygamous marriage contracts would not encour-
age the attitude that women ought to be oppressed and treated as subordinate 
to men, then we could, with good conscience, allow such contracts. However, 
because it does not seem unreasonable for citizens to see the state’s act of con-
doning polygamy as an expression of a reprehensible attitude toward women, 
the state ought to prohibit citizens from forming such contracts. By contrast, 
because it is patently unreasonable for citizens to see the state’s act of condon-
ing same-sex marriage as supporting the oppression and subordination of one 
gender by another, (O1) the female autonomy objection seems to draw the dis-
tinction between harmful and non-harmful domestic partnerships at exactly 
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10 For more on this perspective, see Margaret Denike’s ‘The Racialization of White Man’s 
Polygamy”,’ Hypatia Vol. 25, No. 4 (Fall 2010), pp. 852–874.
11 It is important to separate concerns about social institutions that violate women’s rights 
from the question of whether disallowing such institutions would unjustly restrict female 
autonomy. Marilyn Friedman argues that liberal societies should tolerate minority cul-
tural practices that violate women’s rights so long as women choose autonomously to live 
according to those practices (see Autonomy, Gender, Politics (Studies in Feminist 
Philosophy) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). Later, I argue that what is worrisome 
about allowing polygamous relationships is not that they violate women’s rights, but that 
the right point. The political liberal wishing to accept marriage equality, but to 
reject polygamy seems to have the argument she needs.
However, there are problems with (O1) that prevent it from being a viable 
strategy against the slippery-slope. First, some proponents of the contractual 
account challenge the antecedent at the beginning of the preceding paragraph. 
They argue that since polygamy is currently treated as criminal activity, it 
would be nearly impossible to offer empirical evidence demonstrating a sig-
nificant increase in the practice due to legalization. Similar to the problem 
with accurately stating the number of illegal immigrants living the US, because 
those who live in polygamous arrangements do so under a shroud of secrecy, it 
is difficult to get accurate numbers. Yet, we can be certain that legalization 
would provide vulnerable women with the resources they desperately need to 
emerge from the shadows and to gain the legal protection afforded by the law. 
Thus, there are reasons to think that legalizing polygamy, rather than leading 
to a decrease in female autonomy overall, would allow government better to 
regulate the practice so as to protect vulnerable individuals in these relation-
ships whose autonomy and power is currently being unjustly limited primarily 
because the practice is criminalized.10
Additionally, they argue that whether legalization of polygamy would be 
taken as displaying a dismissive attitude toward the subordinate status of 
women in general largely depends upon the details of the legislation, the cir-
cumstances surrounding legalization, and the actual attitudes of actual legisla-
tors being expressed through the act of striking down or replacing the law. If 
this is correct, then many harms that we associate with polygamy seem to 
belong to polygamy only as practiced and we cannot overlook the fact that 
polygamy is practiced within the context of being labeled as criminal activity. 
Therefore, since it is far from obvious that citizens would see the act of legal-
ization as expressive of a lack of concern for female oppression and since legal-
ization would almost certainly increase the autonomy of those currently being 
subordinated and labeled as criminals, advocates for legalization of polygamy 
argue that continuing to outlaw the practice would do more harm than good.11
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 even if women autonomously choose to enter into polygynous relationships these 
arrangements increase the risk of exploitation due to unequal bargaining positions.
12 In fact, the female autonomy objection may work better as an objection to the institution 
of marriage more broadly. If it can be shown that the practice of traditional marriage 
itself tends to increase discrimination against or oppression of women in liberal societies, 
then it is possible to apply the objection more broadly.
13 Although the TV series Big Love is fictional, the creators of the show take themselves to be 
making a feminist statement, which seems quite plausible (NPR interview ‘Big Love’s 
Creators Deconstruct the Show’s Finale’ March 21, 2011). The women involved in the 
polygamous marriage are portrayed as viewing their relationship as empowering in a 
number of ways. For example, they are able to distribute childcare and other domestic 
chores among themselves, the burdens of which statistically still fall more to wives than 
husbands in traditional families. This enables the wives more freedom to work outside of 
the home or pursue other independent interests. The women are also portrayed as having 
more bargaining power when they side against their husband on particular issues. So, it 
seems at least conceptually possible that polygamous arrangements could increase 
female autonomy both within and without the family.
Adding more fuel to the decriminalization advocate’s fire, since (O1) is an 
objection to polygamy as practiced, the structure of the societies in which 
polygamy commonly has been practiced is relevant to understanding the 
nature of how it restricts female autonomy and how deeply cuts the objection. 
Because any social institutions involving gender roles will be tainted by the 
patriarchal attitude in society, we ought to keep in mind that one could argue 
that heterosexual marriage arrangements perpetuate the oppression of women 
as well.12 In the same way that we might see traditional marriage in the US 
prior to the 1960s as having enabled the devaluation of ‘feminine’ roles and the 
subordination of women, we might see polygamy as enabling these things 
within societies where such attitudes are prevalent. But this is not evidence 
that polygamy is itself harmful or that it specially perpetuates female oppres-
sion and so is uniquely harmful to women.13 Whether it is polygamy or the 
background conditions against which polygamy is practiced that is the main 
culprit in restricting female autonomy is difficult to disentangle. However, I 
limit my discussion to decriminalization of polygamy within the context of 
liberal democratic societies. In such societies, where there is an effort to use 
the law to promote gender equality and to break down traditional gender roles, 
polygamy, were it legal, would not necessarily be practiced primarily as polyg-
yny or ruled by strong notions of hierarchical gender roles placing women in 
subordinate positions.
I agree with the decriminalization advocates here. Those appealing to (O1) 
the female autonomy objection assume that decriminalization would have no 
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14 I take myself to be largely in agreement here with: Cheshire Calhoun, ‘Who’s Afraid of 
Polygamous Marriage? Lessons for Same-Sex Marriage Advocacy from the History of 
Polygamy,’ San Diego Law Review Vol. 42 (2005), pp. 1023–1042; Martha Nussbaum, Liberty 
of Conscience: In Defense of America’s Tradition of Religious Equality (New York: Basic 
Books, 2008); and Adrienne Davis, ‘Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and 
Bargaining for Equality,’ Columbia Law Review Vol. 110, No. 8 (December 2010), pp. 
1955–2046.
15 ‘The Problem with Polygamy,’ Philosophical Topics Vol. 37, No. 2 (2009), pp. 109–122.
measurable effect on the number of plural marriages taking the form of polyg-
yny relative to the number of plural marriages taking the form of polyandry. 
But this assumption seems wrong. If under the law men and women were 
equally supported in forming plural marriages with multiple partners of the 
opposite sex, then concern about the threat of substantial harm to women 
would fall away. Consequently, it looks as if there is no reason to fear, on the 
basis of (O1), consensual polygamous partnerships being practiced under a law 
respecting gender equality.14
Of course, creating formal rules does not magically dissolve unjust informal 
practices. Still, it does seem that the most worrisome element regarding the 
existing practice of polygamy, i.e., oppression and domination of women, 
would tend to whither under the bright light allowed in by the transparency of 
a democratic legal system. There is little doubt that more cases of polyandry 
(i.e., one wife having multiple husbands) would occur were polygamy legal and 
open to both sexes equally. So it is at least as plausible to think that legalization 
would hasten the erosion of gender inequality, as it is to think that legalization 
would reinforce gender inequality. Within communities whose members may 
not have even seriously considered challenges to their traditions, history has 
shown that changing legislation can force a change in attitude. Thus, given that 
any successful slope-stopping objection must show how polygamy is uniquely 
and inherently harmful in a way that same-sex marriage cannot be, the pros-
pects for using (O1) the female autonomy objection to block the slippery-slope 
argument look to be slim.
2.2 (O2) The Asymmetry of Power Objection to Polygamy
On the other hand, though, are political liberals, e.g., Thom Brooks,15 who 
reject polygamous marriage not because of the mistaken concern about the 
decrease in female autonomy, but because of a more fundamental concern 
about polygamy. This more fundamental concern can be expressed as (O2) the 
asymmetry of power objection. Polygamy threatens equality on a deeper level. 
The argument here is that polygamy, as practiced, not only threatens to 
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increase subordination of women in both the private and public spheres, but 
also, on a more intimate level, the power imbalance inherent in polygamous 
arrangements threatens the equality between the partners within the marriage 
regardless of the gender make-up. From the rights-based perspective, we could 
say that the inegalitarian or hierarchical structure of polygamous relationships 
is fundamentally adverse to marriage equality and consequently, the threat to 
the right to equality of those who would choose to enter into a polygamous 
marriage contract is enough to make such contracts impermissible.
Consider the situation in a typical polygynous relationship. The inegalitar-
ian or hierarchical structure lends itself to an unequal division of labor in 
which the man ends up with more power than each of the women involved. 
Certainly, domestic partnerships need not be tied to specific sexual relation-
ships or sexual norms, but the sexual habits of those in typical polygamous 
unions (i.e., those taken to fall within the purview of certain religious sects) 
regularly do reveal an asymmetry of power. Only the husband has polygamous 
sexual relations; the sexual relations of the sister-wives are monogamous. Also, 
Brooks points out that only the man has unilateral power to introduce new 
wives or to divorce any one of his wives. Sister-wives do not have equal power 
unilaterally to divorce any of the other wives. Though the sister-wives are mar-
ried to one another in some sense, the horizontal contract among them seems 
to be distinct in kind from the vertical one between the husband and each of 
his wives. This, says Brooks, shows that polygamy includes, as a fundamental 
element, an inherently unequal power structure that cannot be attributed to 
the patriarchal attitudes of those typically involved. On this view, harmful mar-
riages are those that have as a fundamental element an unequal power struc-
ture. Furthermore, since this is a worry unique to marriage forms where one 
person occupies a single role, while multiple others share a single role, (O2) 
seems to offer a slide-stopping response showing how we might draw a line 
between polygamous marriages and same-sex marriages, which do not take 
this form.
However, there are two problems with using an unequal power structure as 
the criterion for stopping the slide. First, it assumes that there is something 
necessarily harmful about inegalitarian or hierarchical power structures. But 
liberal societies permit many inegalitarian arrangements and institutions that 
seem unproblematic. To cite just one example, we do not normally worry about 
the parent-to-young-child relationship, which is clearly hierarchical in nature. 
In fact, we find it more worrisome when such a relationship is not hierarchical. 
Now Brooks might respond here that there are certain natural hierarchies that 
are permissible because they are beneficial to everyone and that hierarchical 
marriages are neither natural nor beneficial to anyone. But there are other 
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16 Gregg Strauss has a good discussion of two ways to modify polygamy to avoid this objec-
tion in ‘Is Polygamy Inherently Unequal?,’ Ethics Vol. 122, No. 3 (April 2012), pp. 516–544.
hierarchical arrangements, e.g., between seller and buyer, which are not obvi-
ously natural in character, but which we nonetheless find acceptable as well. 
Unless equality among interpersonal relationships is necessary for the well-
being of parties to the contract, there is no reason to think that inegalitarian 
relationships, arrangements, institutions, or contracts are inherently harmful 
or that the costs of being on the bottom end of the hierarchy necessarily out-
weigh the benefits. The harm, instead, arises, when it does, because individuals 
within interpersonal relationships that have this hierarchical structure likely 
started out from unequal bargaining positions prior to the arrangement. Later 
I will show that the harm that some attribute to polygamy should be under-
stood as stemming from an increased risk of exploitation rather than from the 
hierarchical structure of the relationship. The context in which hierarchical 
agreements are made makes a difference.
The second problem with using the (O2) asymmetry of power objection to 
stop the slippery-slope is that it looks as if a response similar to the one raised 
against (O1) would work here also. Just as we found that the female autonomy 
objection only shows what is harmful about polygamy as practiced within 
strongly patriarchal societies and that there is reason to think that legalizing 
polygamy would allow liberal democratic societies to regulate the practice 
controlling for those harms, the same is true for the harms associated with 
asymmetrical power structures. Recall Brooks’ example concerning the asym-
metrical ability to divorce. It seems that legislation could be designed to 
accommodate multi-party contracts with equal terms for all participants.16 
Divorce law would simply need to be rewritten to apply to polygamous mar-
riage contracts. Under such laws all members would have an equal right to 
dissolve the marriage creating reasonable exit options for all parties to the con-
tract. In order to illustrate this idea, consider the following scenario: Cleopatra, 
who is the head-of-household, marries Mark Antony, Julius Caesar, and 
Genghis Khan. Subsequently, Genghis who is deeply disappointed in Mark 
Antony for losing the Battle of Actium to Octavian, decides he wants to divorce 
Mark Antony, but he still wishes to remain married to the others. So under the 
new divorce law, Genghis, Julius, and Cleopatra would create a new marriage 
contract, while Mark, Julius, and Cleopatra would create another new mar-
riage contract. The original marriage would be dissolved and two new mar-
riage contracts drawn up.
Now, other than creating a headache for divorce attorneys and judges, there 
seems to be little objectionable about this type of legislation. Such a law would 
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17 The asymmetrical power to divorce is not Brooks’ only objection to polygamy, however. 
He also discusses empirical evidence showing the risk of harm in practice to women, 
children, and men (p. 4–7), and says that polygamy discriminates against non-heterosex-
uals (p. 14). So, although a change to divorce law that better accommodates consent in 
plural marriage would be relatively easy to achieve, there might remain a structural asym-
metry and imbalance of power because the options open to Cleopatra and her men would 
still differ because of gender inequalities. For example, Brooks says “studies have found 
that only a small fraction of women in polygamous marriages work outside the home” 
(p. 5). Assuming the limited ability to work outside the home can be attributed primarily 
to the power imbalance rather than to, for instance, implicit or explicit religious teachings 
about gender inequalities, such harms would remain even under laws designed to miti-
gate or to eliminate specific gendered options. Finding out whether this assumption has 
legs, though, would require deeper analysis of the empirical evidence to separate out 
harms caused by the structural asymmetry itself.
protect everyone’s rights. Indeed, there is already in place legislation for multi-
party business contracts and there seems to be no, in principle, reason to rule 
out the possibility for using similar standards for multi-party marriage con-
tracts. So long as one person could participate in more than one marriage, leg-
islation could accommodate what is fundamentally harmful about the 
asymmetrical power to divorce in polygamous unions. Again, what seemed a 
necessarily harmful feature of polygamous marriage turns out to be separable 
from the concept of polygamy.17
Perhaps Brooks would respond that such a strategy cannot work because it 
would fundamentally transform the institution of marriage, as we know it. 
Given that according to the status quo each individual is allowed to participate 
in only one marriage at a time, a divorce splitting one polygamous marriage 
into two must be unacceptable because several members then would be simul-
taneously participating in two marriage contracts. However, it is not clear why 
we should follow the status quo on this matter. Perhaps the law would need to 
include provisions against conflicts of interest, but this qualification is not 
impossible to meet. Why should we think there is something uniquely bad 
about participating in more than one marriage at any given time? Were Brooks 
to come up with a plausible answer to this question, perhaps he could jury-rig 
that into an explanation for why we have good reason to prohibit structurally 
inegalitarian domestic relationships, but as it is, the candidates for showing 
how polygamy could be harmful fall away. So, it looks as if (O2) the asymmetry 
of power objection fares no better than (O1) in identifying a harm that is unique 
to polygamy and thus, capable of stopping the slide down the slippery slope.
Let’s pause here and take stock of the implications of these two conclusions, 
before looking at a third objection to polygamy, which I claim is decisive. Given 
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forthcoming. A draft is available online on PhilPapers.
that both (O1) the female autonomy objection and (O2) the asymmetry of 
power objection identify harms associated with polygamy that nonetheless 
can be avoided using legislative means, it seems that the political liberal is left 
with only one option: accept the (libertarian) mantra– ‘let a thousand flowers 
bloom.’ Whereas opponents of same-sex marriage see premise (1) of the slip-
pery-slope argument—legalization of same-sex marriage would provide a 
legal principle for legalization of other, similar types of ‘non-traditional’ 
domestic partnerships (e.g., polygamy)—as a reductio upon any argument for 
legalizing same-sex marriage, the libertarian treats premise (1) as an implica-
tion of the correct view of marriage as being purely a matter of individual taste. 
Embracing the analogy between same-sex marriage and polygamous marriage, 
but denying that any autonomous choice concerning interpersonal relation-
ships could be so harmful as to outweigh the benefit of increasing personal 
freedom, libertarians endorse a radically permissive policy on domestic part-
nerships.18 Thus, it appears that a consistent political liberal must say that so 
long as legislation is in place guaranteeing (a) the position of head-of-house-
hold is equally open to all, regardless of gender, and (b) all adult members of a 
household have an equal right to terminate or to modify the marriage contract, 
then polygamous unions would be as harmless as any other type of marriage 
including same-sex marriage. It seems that the liberal who wants to argue for 
marriage equality and reject polygamy is out of luck. Fortunately, there is a 
third objection that saves the position, which I introduce in the following 
section.
3 Try, Try, Try, and You Will Only Come to this Conclusion
In this section, I construct a harm principle for domestic partnerships based 
on the liberal value of fairness. Although Brooks is onto something with (O2) 
the asymmetry of power objection pointing out that polygamy has a worri-
some hierarchical structure, he is wrong to think that this feature alone is suf-
ficient to justify the law against entering into a polygamous marriage contract 
within a liberal democratic society. I argue that polygamy should remain ille-
gal, but only because the perception that the hierarchical structure of such 
arrangements is less desirable than monogamous arrangements uniquely 
increases the risk of exploitation for especially vulnerable groups who are 
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most likely to enter into polygamous marriages on the plural side. So while I 
agree with Brooks’ conclusion, I also sympathize with the libertarian argument 
since it reveals Brooks’ reasoning to be incomplete. It is not simply the asym-
metry of power that justifies a law prohibiting polygamy. Individuals ought to 
be free to enter into asymmetrical power relationships so long as they are 
choosing to do so from a relatively equal bargaining position. In order to block 
the slippery-slope argument, we need a more complete account of harm that 
shatters the alleged analogy between same-sex marriage and polygamous 
unions. I argue that hierarchical contracts, like polygamy, are only harmful if 
they are exploitative or if they significantly increase the risk of exploitation 
among a population. Unfortunately, I also think, given the structural inequality 
that exists within most liberal democratic societies, the conditions are such 
that legalization of polygamy would in fact increase the risk of exploitation. 
Therefore, (O3) the risk of exploitation objection succeeds in blocking the 
slippery-slope argument.
The first step in my argument is to explain the concept of harm stemming 
from the liberal value of fairness. The concept of harm under examination here 
is broader than that which is understood in the context of either the contract-
based approach or the rights-based approach to the family. Regardless of whether 
someone would voluntarily and intentionally enter into a contract that would 
clearly cause her harm, society ought to reject contracts that violate the rights of 
those who would choose to enter into them. This is the intuition I capture with 
my third objection to polygamy: (O3) the risk of exploitation objection.
Examples such as sweatshops and surrogacy are instructive when thinking 
about how the bargaining positions of potential parties to a contract intui-
tively affect our judgment of the justice involved. Even if there are people liv-
ing in the US who, e.g., because they are homeless or have been unemployed 
for years, would benefit from having the option to take a job that pays less than 
minimum wage and that would require them to work under harsh conditions, 
such a benefit falling to a person only because he is significantly disadvantaged 
as a result of structural injustice cannot justify permitting such contracts. The 
intuitions that resist policies allowing contractual agreements involving sweat-
shops and surrogacy, then, go beyond worries about informed consent or even 
a standard reading of Mill’s harm principle,19 since we could easily envision 
19 The harm principle as stated on p. 9 of On Liberty (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 
1978) suggests that the only justifiable reason for limiting one’s freedom is to prevent 
harm to others. So, the standard reading of Mill’s harm principle cannot explain why 
exploitative contracts are wrong since many of them do offer a net benefit to those who 
are being exploited.
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women, see Elizabeth Anderson’s article on surrogacy (‘Is Women’s Labor a Commodity?,’ 
Philosophy and Public Affairs Vol. 19, No. 1 (Winter 1990), pp. 71–92).
how making such agreements could be both rational and result in a net benefit 
for a person whose quality of life is significantly below some minimal standard 
of decency. It does not seem that the rights-based account completely captures 
what is wrong with contracting to work at a sweatshop or to serve as a surro-
gate mother. So, neither the contract-based nor the rights-based account of 
justice adequately explains our intuitions about these types of contracts.
What is wrong is that such contracts increase the risk of exploitation of vul-
nerable populations. The worry about such contracts arises when we think 
about the individuals who would most likely agree to these contracts and what 
they all have in common. It is only rational to enter into usurious contracts 
when one sees some benefit to entering into the arrangement. Now there are 
many potential reasons that one could end up in a position to benefit from a 
contract most see as usurious; some reasons are benign (e.g., extraordinary 
sympathetic feelings or altruism), but others are the result of structural injus-
tice (e.g., the lack of an accommodation for a disability). The best indication of 
whether individuals generally enter into a particular hierarchical arrangement 
motivated by benign reasons or because of structural injustice is to consider 
whether the parties to the contract begin from radically unequal bargaining 
positions. Were women entering into surrogate motherhood being primarily 
motivated by sympathy for women who are unable to bear their own children, 
then we would not see a disproportionate number of poor women acting as 
surrogates for wealthy “social parents.”20 Presumably, poorer women have not 
cornered the market on sympathetic feelings. But it is rare for a woman to bear 
a child for a complete stranger purely out of sympathy. Our suspicions about 
contracts between parties starting from radically different positions of power 
stem from our intuitions about the overall increased risk of exploitation that 
would arise were such contracts legally enforced. Hence, concerns about fair-
ness give rise to policies prohibiting contracts that are harmful in this broader 
sense, i.e., contracts that, in principle, may or may not threaten the rights of 
the parties to the contract, but nonetheless do increase the risk of exploitation 
for disadvantaged members.
I think similar concerns also come into play when we consider marriage 
contracts. What advocates of the contract-based approach to marriage and the 
family fail to see is that liberal democratic societies ought to promote other 
liberal values in addition to freedom and autonomy and these additional val-
ues are relevant to deciding which domestic partnerships are consistent with 
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21 I also think this rule should apply to certain types of unequally bargained monogamous 
relationships. For instance, I think that arranged marriages ought to be illegal because 
there is good reason to assume that (a) such marriages are not entered into voluntarily 
and that (b) certain vulnerable groups suffer most often under such arrangements.
aspiring to create a more ideal liberal democratic society. Far from being purely 
a matter of personal preference, marriage is a liberal institution that can affect 
overall justice in society. That entering into domestic partnerships involves 
hybrid considerations both private and social in manner does not show that 
respect for the privacy of individuals should trump the harmful social implica-
tions of allowing domestic partnerships that would increase the risk of exploi-
tation of vulnerable individuals. Insofar as the rights-based approach takes 
seriously values that many liberals find appealing and applicable to contracts 
in non-domestic contexts, it better captures contemporary liberal intuitions 
about blending the private and the social aspects of marriage contracts as well; 
however, the rights-based approach cannot explain why increasing the risk of 
exploitation for a vulnerable population could be enough to reject contracts as 
well. Thus, we see that where one party to a contract stands to gain a great deal 
more than the other, the minimal condition of voluntary and intentional 
agreement among parties to a contract and protection against the violation of 
the rights of the parties is not sufficient to allay all of our worries about at least 
certain types of agreements.21
If we think of the marriage market as analogous to the labor market or to 
the market for surrogate mothers, we see that the same worries that arise in 
the latter two cases also crop up when it comes to marriage. Just as those who 
are at a significant disadvantage relative to other potential workers in the 
labor market are most willing to work in sweatshops, those who are at a sig-
nificant disadvantage relative to other potential mates would be most willing 
to become a third wife or a fourth husband. Intuitively, we bristle at these 
other types of non-domestic arrangements that involve parties in vastly 
unequal bargaining positions, even though it is often difficult to identify a par-
ticular harm to the individual resulting from the practice itself, and we recog-
nize that there ought to be limits to such contracts. As a result, at least some 
liberal democratic societies outlaw sweatshops and refuse to enforce surro-
gacy contracts. Beyond this, they pass laws making it possible for the creation 
of institutions, such as labor unions and adoption agencies, to protect the 
most vulnerable members of society from being exploited. So unless and until 
analogous institutions are in place to protect the choices of the most vulner-
able in the marriage market, I contend that it would be a mistake to decrimi-
nalize polygamy.
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To further demonstrate this, we need only examine more carefully who 
might be tempted to enter into a polygamous marriage on the multiple side 
were we today to decriminalize polygamy in the US. I submit that polygamy 
would be most attractive to those who face a greater risk of or increased per-
sonal cost to never marrying. The vulnerability these individuals face mani-
fests itself in a variety of ways. One could be under more social pressure to 
reproduce due to her identity with a particular ethnic group or simply because 
one’s family puts more emphasis on marriage and procreation than is the norm 
within society. Beyond social pressure, there is of course economic pressure to 
marry and to be a part of a family. Were polygamy to become legally available, 
presumably members of such associations would be entitled to certain eco-
nomic benefits from the state, since currently there are benefits attached to 
traditional forms of marriage in liberal societies. This means that were polyga-
mous marriage a legal live option, it would be almost certainly preferable to 
homelessness and perhaps preferable to accepting state welfare or to becom-
ing a single parent. But the point is that in order for legal polygamy in a liberal 
society to seem a tempting prospect for an individual who is for some reason 
(probably economic, but perhaps social as well) prevented from becoming a 
head-of-household himself or herself, some outside pressures must make one 
think, ‘I’ll take my chances in a polygamous marriage.’ In order for polygamy to 
be preferable to one’s current situation, one first must be disadvantaged by the 
background conditions of his choice. Thus, I argue that although there is noth-
ing per se wrong with contracts involving an asymmetry of power, there is 
something wrong with asymmetrical contracts between parties that start out 
in vastly unequal bargaining positions relative to the content of the contrac-
tual agreement.22
To clarify my position: what distinguishes harmful marriages from non-
harmful ones is not merely a matter of the tendency of one type of structure 
(i.e., one marriage partner occupying a single power position, while several 
other partners share a single power position) to reinforce societal injustices or 
to exacerbate harms that already exist in the background structure. Instead, 
my concern is that so long as one form of marriage is perceived as being more 
desirable than another, only those at a distinct bargaining disadvantage 
22 Notice that simply having less social standing than one’s bargaining partner, does not 
automatically place one in an unequal bargaining position. The inequality of bargaining 
position is highly contextual. Consider a simple example: suppose that Joe owns a thrift 
store and that someone happens to have inadvertently donated a rare antique to the 
store. Now Paul, who owns a Fortune 500 company, happens also to be an antiques collec-
tor and is willing to pay almost anything to acquire the antique. Although Joe belongs to 
a lower social class than Paul, Joe occupies the dominant bargaining position in this case.
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and insist that they are not and have never been exploited. I do not mean to suggest that 
every wife in a plural marriage is being exploited or must have been in a disadvantaged 
bargaining position when she entered into the marriage. But as a matter of public policy, 
the only way to be sure that decriminalization of polygamy would not significantly 
increase the risk of exploitation of the most vulnerable citizens, is first to guarantee that 
structural injustice is addressed.
relative to others will choose to enter into the less desirable arrangements. This 
means that regardless of whether such a choice actually ends up harming the 
individual, i.e., the individual ends up worse off than she would have been if 
she had chosen not to enter the marriage, the risk of harm does fall dispropor-
tionately on the least advantaged. Therefore, decriminalizing these types of 
contracts would be wrong because of the resultant general increased risk of 
exploitation.
If I am right about this third objection to polygamy, the contract-based and 
rights-based approaches to marriage are only plausible after other sources of 
injustice and inequality in society have been addressed. Only then can we rest 
assured that all parties to a hierarchical marriage contract begin from a rela-
tively equal bargaining position and no one makes the choice to enter into a 
polygamous marriage only because he sees it as the most rational choice out of 
several bad options. To clarify further, I do not mean to suggest that no one in 
his (or her) right mind could voluntarily and intentionally choose to enter into 
a polygamous marriage as the second or third husband (or wife); there are 
potentially good reasons to prefer such an arrangement, e.g., true love.23 But I 
do think that within a structurally inegalitarian society, we have a prima facie 
reason to be skeptical that such arrangements have been entered into for good 
reasons. Therefore, I argue that polygamy and perhaps other types of hierarchi-
cal marriage arrangements that threaten to increase the risk of exploitation 
ought to remain illegal within structurally inegalitarian liberal democratic 
societies.
4 Objections
In this final section, I forestall three objections to my argument. The first two 
objections claim to show that my argument proves too little and the third 
claims to show that my argument proves too much. I address each objection in 
turn. First though, a clarification of terms: my definition of polygamy is admit-
tedly quite narrow. I do not mean to catch in my net polyamorous 
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arrangements that are not obviously structurally hierarchical in nature; for 
example, if a heterosexual couple were to decide to marry their three homo-
sexual friends, that would not necessarily count as a harmful marriage on my 
view because I think the perception that polygamous marriages are less desir-
able primarily results from worries about the structural hierarchy. At least, as I 
envision the distinction between polyamory and polygamy, the power sharing 
in the former is much less hierarchical in nature. Perhaps it is accurate to say 
that there is no clear head-of-household in a truly polyamorous relationship. If 
this is correct, then it does not make sense to describe members of these types 
of arrangements as sharing a particular role, at least not in a way that is prob-
lematic according to my view. Because I identify power sharing among subor-
dinates as the source of the hierarchy and the potential for exploitation 
inherent in polygamous unions, I am only concerned with interpersonal 
arrangements of a fairly specific type: where one person owns a particular role, 
i.e., head-of-household, while several others share another subordinate role.24 
Only these have the potential objectionably to exploit vulnerable individuals 
on my view.
Now, here, my interlocutor may protest that I have simply propped up a 
strawman to pummel. My definition of polygamy is based upon a caricature of 
real marriage since no household actually operates along such strictly hierar-
chical rules. Even in a traditional heterosexual marriage where both partners 
might label the male as the head-of-household, the division of labor typically 
is such that it hardly makes sense to call it hierarchical, unless we are viewing 
things through a purely gendered or at least a purely market-oriented prism 
where, e.g., being tasked with doing the finances is treated as being more valu-
able than doing the cooking and the one playing each role stays exactly the 
same throughout the entire marriage. In reality, husbands, wives, and partners 
often trade-off different household tasks, so we would expect the same, even 
more so, to be true of households in which there are multiple husbands or 
multiple wives. Further, the concept ‘head-of-household’ is an antiquated term 
belonging to a bygone era. Thus, to say that these sorts of hierarchical arrange-
ments are harmful, even if true, is like warning people that covered wagons are 
harmful.
My response to this first objection is as follows: first, the claim that most 
households do not operate according to a hierarchical structure would need to 
be settled, at least in part by empirical evidence. But the idea that 
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have been on the single side of polygamous marriages, a non-gendered imbalance of 
power within such marriages is evident (‘Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, 
and Bargaining for Equality’).
hierarchical marriage arrangements are rare seems naïve at best. Now it may 
be true that only polygynous relationships, as opposed to polyandrous rela-
tionships, tend to be hierarchical in nature due to the prevalence of gender 
discrimination, which means that (O3) the risk of exploitation objection could 
reduce to (O1) the female autonomy objection; however, this claim definitely 
requires empirical evidence for which there is not enough data to be conclu-
sive.25 In order for such an empirical claim to deflect my argument, we would 
need to compare polygynous to polyandrous marriages taking place against 
the background of various social structures. Second, I think the conceptual 
evaluation of my objector’s claim falls to my favor. Even if I grant that within 
most two-adult households, the adults trade-off responsibilities, (a) there is 
more to being a head-of-household than performing the ‘more valuable’ 
responsibilities (e.g., always having the option to choose which responsibilities 
to undertake while other household members never or rarely get to choose) 
and (b) I deny that the addition of more adults would lead to a more equal 
sharing of power. The power asymmetry comes from adding adults on one side 
of the relationship (i.e., adding adults whose role in the household is as an 
additional wife or an additional husband) and from the fact that the adults on 
that side have a different type of power relationship with one another than 
they have with the person on the opposite side of the relationship.
Now the second objection to my view continues the line of argument begun 
by the first. Not only is my definition of polygamy too narrow, but also my argu-
ment is trivial in another respect: (O3) the risk of exploitation only impales 
polygamous marriages between parties who are members of different social 
classes. (O3) is only a problem for parties that are in vastly different bargaining 
positions; so presumably if the parties considering such an arrangement have 
similar social statuses, the risk of exploitation would not increase since my 
worry about background inequality would not apply. Therefore, my argument 
cannot show why we should have a blanket law against polygamy, even were 
we to accept my narrow definition of polygamous marriage as between one 
person owning a role and multiple people sharing a role. It seems that the con-
cern only arises for an even smaller sub-section of polygamous relationships.
I respond to this second objection by appealing to the nature of law. If we 
take into account that I began the paper intending to discuss whether lib-
eral democratic societies ought to decriminalize polygamous marriage 
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benefit the worst off, Rawlsian liberals ought to reject marriage as a state institution (‘Is 
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(1999), pp. 37–56). I agree with Munoz-Darde, as I agree with the libertarian, in principle. 
My primary concern though is with marriage law in a non-ideally liberal society.
contracts, we see that I am concerned with polygamy as a matter of public 
policy. So if it is true that, given the structure of a particular society, a par-
ticular law would tend to increase exploitation or would create a new risk of 
exploitation for particular vulnerable groups, then as a matter of public 
policy, such a law would be unjust according to my view. My claim is not 
that all polygamous marriages necessarily exploit people. As I acknowledge 
earlier, there could indeed be good reasons, unrelated to exploitation, to 
enter into such an arrangement, but unless and until we can be confident 
that the structural injustices are not impacting the marital choices that the 
least advantaged members of society are making, it is wrong to legalize 
arrangements that are characterized by an asymmetrical power relation as a 
structural feature.
Finally, rather than objecting that my argument proves too little, one might 
object that it proves too much. This objector, contrary to the first two, agrees 
that many marriages are hierarchical in nature and that many types of mar-
riages involve a power imbalance, for example, heterosexual or homosexual 
monogamous marriages to alcoholics or marriages between members of par-
ticular sects of Christianity who take literally the biblical imperative in 
Ephesians 5:22: “Wives should be subordinate to their husbands as to the 
Lord.”26 But my objector sees this as a reason to reject my distinction between 
harmful and non-harmful marriages based on (O3) the risk of exploitation 
objection. Though she may side with me (against Brooks) saying that hierar-
chical contracts are not in themselves unjust, and with some libertarians who 
argue that what makes such arrangements toxic is that the state chooses arbi-
trarily to reward those who enter into civil marriages, she argues that my rejec-
tion of hierarchical contracts that risk exploitation entails a wholesale rejection 
of the institution of marriage. The fact of structural injustice should make us 
suspicious of all potentially hierarchical contracts, which includes all marriage 
contracts, not just polygamous ones.27 Thus, my distinction no longer makes 
sense. According to this objection, my argument actually stands as a more 
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general critique of the institution of civil marriage rather than as a critique of 
polygamous marriage.28
Against this final objection, I offer a partial concession and a reformulation. 
Although I agree that there are many potential sources of hierarchy within 
interpersonal relationships and though I am willing to concede that my argu-
ment provides reason to reject at least certain types of hierarchical monoga-
mous marriages as well, I do think that polygamy is distinctively exploitative. I 
think the role-sharing aspect of polygamy uniquely reinforces the hierarchy 
inherent in the structure of the arrangement in a way that at least some hierar-
chical monogamous arrangements do not. In polygamous marriages, the par-
ticipants on the multiple-side vie for positioning relative to each other, but are 
always subordinate to the participant on the single-side. This means that one 
who enters into a polygamous marriage as an addition to the multiple-side is 
accepting a doubly subordinate role. While it is possible that certain types of 
monogamous marriages have similar built-in structural hierarchies, it is at 
least less obvious, from the standpoint of the law, toward which partner the 
power balance tips. Consequently, I am willing to concede that any marriage 
type that includes a clear structural inequality and that would disproportion-
ately attract members of a particular disadvantaged group ought to be rejected 
as unjust. The problem is that the power asymmetry within monogamous rela-
tionships is rarely so clear as it is within a polygamous relationship. Thus, my 
distinction between marriage types that increase the risk of exploitation and 
marriage types that do not stands firm.
In addition, it is important to keep in mind that marriage legislation is an 
especially thorny area. The balance between creating laws that avoid exploita-
tion and other harms and creating laws that do not interfere in the private lives 
of citizens is a difficult one. Although I am wary, then, of legislation that would 
encourage the formation of structurally unequal contracts within a society 
characterized by individuals in vastly unequal bargaining positions, I do not 
think the solution is to reject marriage as a civil institution. Rather, what is 
needed is more attention to the background of structural injustice so that we 
can rest assured that any contracts individuals choose to enter are not a result 
of their being at a disadvantage relative to their contractual partners and to 
their peers.
Ultimately, as I have said, in an ideally just society or one that approaches 
the ideal in a way that our own currently does not, I think the ‘let a thousand 
flowers bloom’ mantra rings true, but given that we are thinking about this 
issue within the context of a non-ideally just liberal democratic society, the 
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proper question to ask is this: would decriminalizing polygamy lead us toward 
the liberal ideal or away from it? Therefore, although I think marriage laws in 
the US and in other liberal democratic nations are in need of reform, 
I also think there are better and worse ways to institute the correct reforms. I 
fear that abolishing the institution of marriage altogether, at least given pre-
vailing attitudes, would have negative unintended consequences.
To conclude briefly, although both the contract-based approach and the 
rights-based approach to marriage have resources for responding to the slip-
pery-slope indictment offered by opponents of same-sex marriage, I show that 
my own approach has the advantage of better fitting our intuitions about how 
best to promote liberal values. I argue that my non-exploitation approach to 
marriage can provide a criterion upon which liberal theorists, who wish to 
defend same-sex marriage, but also to reject polygamous marriage, could base 
their argument. Although the standard objections to polygamy fail to block the 
slippery-slope objection to same-sex marriage, my objection to polygamy say-
ing that decriminalization would increase the risk of exploitation for vulnera-
ble members of liberal democratic societies, successfully draws the line 
between harmful and non-harmful marriage arrangements.29
